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INTRODUCTION: FROM THE INTERNATIONAL TO THE LOCAL
For many people across the globe, human rights remain aspirational.
American politicians and diplomats often speak of the need to improve
human rights abroad in places such as China, Sudan, and North Korea.1

∗

Assistant Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Thanks to Steve Gey, Aaron
Saiger, David Schleicher, and all the participants in the Cooper-Walsh Colloquium. Jamie
Koscicek provided excellent research assistance.
1. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE
U.S.
RECORD
2006
(2006),
available
at
http://www.state.gov/documents/
organization/80699.pdf; Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State, Remarks on the Sudan Strategy (Oct. 19, 2009), available at www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/10/
130686.htm.
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Popular political discourse recognizes much less often the need to turn inward and improve our own government’s human rights behavior, be it federal, state, or local. Despite the lack of mainstream support, for the last
several years, NGOs and academics have increasingly criticized the failure
of domestic actors to successfully bring human rights home. These critiques have given way to a second stage in the human rights struggle—the
articulation of justifications, structures, and specific policies for implementing domestic human rights.
This piece is the fourth of a multi-part series of papers that takes a supportive but also critical approach to the project of bringing international
law home. The first piece, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law,2 documented the
existence of apathetic and intransigent federal actors and identified the role
of sub-federal actors such as states and cities in implementing unratified
and non-self-executing treaty law. In so doing, that paper acknowledged
the significant federal limits on such behavior and discussed the limited
role of sub-federal actors in promoting federal ratification. It also hypothesized that existing local and regional efforts on the Kyoto Protocol and the
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (“CEDAW”) would serve as models for expanded sub-federal behavior.
The second piece, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights
Law in Addressing Immigration,3 contended that even unratified international human rights law influences non-binding regional processes, contributes to the development and dissemination of best practices, and helps
produce and codify a human rights discourse. I looked outside of formal
international law structures to identify ways in which human rights can
move from international law into the state. This Article investigated regional consultative processes and Italy’s immigration reforms as examples
of state actors undertaking voluntary compliance with human rights norms
outside of traditional pathways.
Most recently, Human Rights Impact Statements: An Immigration Case
Study4 proposed that domestic government actors, including states and localities, undertake human rights review of pending legislative and agency
actions. I used the highly successful and much copied model of environ-

2. Lesley Wexler, Take the Long Way Home: Sub-Federal Integration of Unratified
and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Law, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1 (2006).
3. Lesley Wexler, The Non-Legal Role of International Human Rights Law in Addressing Immigration, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 359.
4. Lesley Wexler, Human Rights Impact Statements: An Immigration Case Study, 22
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 285 (2008).
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mental impact statements as a starting point, but looked also at instances
where government actors used such reviews to conduct more qualitative
analyses. This Article addressed some design issues raised by such a proposal including: (1) which policies should be subject to assessment; (2)
which governmental entities should conduct them; and (3) what consequences ought to flow from a human rights assessment or impact statement.
Though I reached no conclusive recommendations, I noted the possibility
and benefits of state and local experimentation in working through some of
these design questions.
As a part of this larger project, this Article once again focuses on cities
as a vital pathway for the movement from the international to the local.
Like the prior works, this Article mixes theories, hypotheses, and case studies to illuminate the potential for bringing international law home. While
the nation-state remains an extremely important player in the formation and
enforcement of international law, international law also influences behavior
by moving through sub-federal actors and regional sites. Sometimes this
change occurs at the national government’s behest, but oftentimes it also
occurs when other government actors bypass those nation-states resistant to
its pull. This Article seeks to explain why and how cities in particular can
play an important role in bringing human rights home.
In the fifth and likely final paper, I anticipate concluding this discussion
by looking closely at various methods to move human rights into the administrative state. That piece will compare a variety of human rights institutions that can be integrated at the federal, state, and local levels. I wish to
look more deeply at the possibility for human rights impact statements, as
well as determining the role for human rights commissions and ombudsmen. I plan on returning to some of the case studies introduced in earlier
works, but this time for a sense of their administrative structure and design
choices.
In so doing, this final work seeks to complete the cycle with the philosophical justifications for administrating the human rights state. The works
in this project share the assumption that while we may all inherently possess human rights, the contours of those rights are also something articulated in and constituted by both international and domestic law. Thus, this
Article will also return to the recurring theme of creating a human rights
discourse. I intend to argue that advocates sometimes overlook the boundaries of those inherent human rights and elide the justifications needed for
creating enforceable protection of them. I will suggest that administrating
a human rights state can create the sort of reasoned articulation necessary
to forge a consensus in favor of strong human rights protection. I wish to
show how these various human rights institutions themselves can serve as
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justifying bodies for the content of human rights by serving as vital sites of
specification.
Before moving into this final component, however, this current paper
needs to first explain the role of cities in the overall project. In recent
years, international law scholarship has moved beyond a statist conception
in which only national governments create and then implement international law.5 Rather, bodies at all levels ranging from the transnational, such as
regional consultative process and more formal international institutions, to
state legislatures and state courts, and to local units such as cities, have all
become active participants in the project of enshrining human rights in law.
While previous works mostly took as a given federal inactivity in regards
to human rights treaties, Part I reviews the numerous historical, political,
and structural reasons for the limited federal efforts to integrate human
rights treaties at home. These include the institutional objections of International Federalists, the substantive objections of Positive Rights Rejecters,
and the political discretion concerns of the Flexible Foreign Policy Advocates. Although a domestic constituency supportive of human rights exists,
until recently, it has focused mainly on human rights promotion rather than
internal integration, and, thus, not created a strong counterbalance to the
various political opponents.
I then link these political objections to the various structural hurdles
through which treaties must pass. Such obstacles include the limited power
of the executive’s signature, the composition of the Senate, and various Senate procedures for treaty ratification. Though such obstacles are not insurmountable, I explain why they are particularly likely to pose challenges
for human rights treaties.
Part II begins with a typology of various local human rights initiatives.
Such categorization can help identify when constitutional, political, and
5. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, The Future of International Law is Domestic (or, The European Way of Law), in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 110 (Janne Nijman & André Nollkaemper eds., 2007); Sarah Cleveland & Catherine Powell, Foreword to Human Rights in
the United States: A Special Issue Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the Human Rights
Institute at Columbia Law School, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2008); Janet Koven Levit, Bottom-Up International Lawmaking: Reflections on the New Haven School of International Law, 32 YALE J. INT’L L. 393 (2007); Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation’s Diagonal Regulatory Role, 49 VA. J. INT’L L. 585 (2009); Catherine
Powell, Foreword to Symposium, International Law and the Constitution: Terms of Engagement, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2008); Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L.J. 619 (2001); Melissa A. Waters, Creeping
Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties,
107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007); Melissa A. Waters, Normativity in the “New” Schools:
Assessing the Legitimacy of International Legal Norms Created by Domestic Courts, 32
YALE J. INT’L L. 455 (2007).
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economic limitations are most likely to be present. I then articulate some
reasons why some cities might be more likely—and more effective—first
movers. These include possible political homogeneity, avoidance of certain federal level objections, enhanced capacity to generate visible benefits
for their constituents, and structural advantages in passing ordinances. In
undertaking those efforts to integrate human rights, cities might create
some local benefits that exist above and beyond mere substitution for federal action. I also wish to identify some of the city-specific gains that may
arise from local implementation. Cities can capture good governance gains
independent of whether the federal government decides to act. As they often provide basic social services and possess a large bureaucracy, subjecting city bureaucracies to human rights creates gains for its residents, regardless of what actions states and the federal government decide to
undertake. So even in those instances in which the federal government acts
to bring human rights home, cities can supplement and reinforce those efforts by acting as laboratories and providing an additional layer of protection by promoting good government.
This section, however, concludes by identifying some structural limitations on cities that do not exist at the federal level and by cautioning those
who believe cities to be a likely motivator of federal behavior.6 Many of
the same factors that allow cities space to act also serve as impediments to
effective state and federal spillovers. While cities can perform much significant work bringing human rights home, we must simultaneously acknowledge that they also labor under significant structural and political
constraints in order to have a realistic sense of cities’ true potential in
bringing human rights home.
I. U.S. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AS A RELUCTANT AND INCOMPLETE
FIRST MOVER
Given the federal government’s exclusive authority to conduct treaties
with foreign powers7 and the limitation on sub-federal actors’ abilities to
conduct agreements and compacts with those same actors, the federal government seems at first blush to be the first best actor in bringing human
rights home. Regardless of this statement’s accuracy, it does not necessarily follow that the U.S. federal government will or must be the first mover
in this arena. This section details the various reasons why the U.S. federal
government is often, and perhaps systemically, reluctant to prioritize the

6. I have discussed in other works why cities cannot capture all of the benefits of treaty
ratification, so I will not return to that subject here. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 2, at 32-35.
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
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ratification and domestic enforcement of international human rights as embodied in treaty law.
Before describing the reasons for the government’s reluctance, I want to
draw attention to two rather large, related assumptions of my project. First,
this Article presumes that many benefits flow from framing substantive
policies in the human rights framework. While this Article looks at many
human rights treaties and ordinances that might be reimagined instead as
part of a civil rights agenda, or public health program, or good governance
initiative, I more fully explore the reasons to prefer a human rights framework in some of the other papers in this series. In short, I have argued
elsewhere human rights may provide a better mechanism to mobilize domestic and international support, build domestic and international networks, and capture domestic and international media attention. Of course,
such a contention is an empirical question that needs to be empirically
tested.8 Yet this paper addresses a different part of the puzzle by explaining why some cities may be particularly likely to pass human rights ordinances, what those projects look like, and what legal and political constraints
may prevent the spillover of such efforts.
Second, I presume that the human rights framework should be tied to international law. Once again, the underlying justifications for these assumptions are developed in prior works. I only briefly revisit those articulations
here. I contend that international law
produc[es] a fully articulated framework by which to understand the problem underlying the [law]; reduc[es] drafting costs for welfare-maximizing
legislation; provid[es] focal points that cities and states can use to measure compliance; offer[s] evidence of an international consensus on the existence of, and approach to, a problem; and present[s] an instrument to
express and signal a cosmopolitan self identity.9

Of course, for those who resist the call of cosmopolitanism, many of these
benefits seem to be costs instead, particularly when preexisting domestic
law can serve some of the other functions I identify.
A.

Objecting to the Federal Integration of Domestic Human Rights

Since the passage of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”), the United States has developed an uneasy relationship with the
international human rights project. Neither Democratic nor Republican

8. See Clifford Bob, Bringing Rights Home? The Promises and Pitfalls of Rights
Strategies in Social Justice Advocacy (May 7, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=989048 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink)).
9. Wexler, supra note 2, at 13.
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presidents have embraced the full panoply of strategies to recognize and
implement human rights domestically. The U.S. government has long resisted signing and ratifying many major human rights treaties such as the
CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”).10 Even
ratification of major human rights treaties leads to few federal legislative
changes or initiatives.11 Unlike its European counterparts,12 the U.S. federal government has created no national human rights institution, utilizes no
human rights ombudspersons, lacks a human rights commission, and fails
to conduct human rights impact statements on proposed initiatives. Yet, at
various times over the last sixty years, the United States proudly carried the
mantle of a human rights leader. American diplomats aggressively drafted
and promoted various human rights treaties including the UDHR,13 the
CRC,14 and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination.15 American presidents on both sides of the aisle
have cited human rights as justifications for supporting particular foreign
leaders, limiting military and economic aid for various regimes, and even
using military force.16 Although America’s relationship with international
human rights law is a long and complicated one, this section identifies several political positions that help explain why, despite varying and often
high levels of national support for human rights, the federal government is
generally unlikely to be a first mover on domestic integration of international human rights.17
The first set of arguments I identify as belonging to “International Federalists,” who vigorously oppose human rights treaties as (1) imposing on
domestic sovereignty by subordinating the federal government to interna10. US: Treaty Signing Signals Policy Shift, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, July 24, 2009,
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/07/24/us-treaty-signing-signals-policy-shift (noting that
“The United States has signed six of the nine core international human rights treaties, but
ratified only three.”).
11. Kenneth Roth, The Charade of US Ratification of International Human Rights Treaties, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 347 (2000).
12. See generally Gauthier de Beco, National Human Rights Institutions in Europe, 7
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 331 (2007).
13. See NATALIE HEVENER KAUFMAN, HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES AND THE SENATE: A
HISTORY OF OPPOSITION 73-78 (1990).
14. See SHARON DETRICK, A COMMENTARY ON THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON
THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD 650-56 (1999) (describing the drafting of the CRC).
15. See NATAN LERNER, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL FORMS OF
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 29-82 (1970) (identifying U.S. involvement in the drafting of the
Convention).
16. See, e.g., Shirin Ebadi, Keynote Address: Islam, Human Rights, and Iran (Oct. 17,
2008), in 23 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 13, 16-21 (2009).
17. For a more detailed explanation of why the U.S. is unlikely to join treaties, see Wexler, supra note 2, at 38-41.
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tional decision-makers and/or (2) infringing on states’ rights by allowing
the federal government to use treaties as an end run around states’ authority.18 While various groups oppose the specific content of particular human
rights agreements, many of these opponents care, or at least claim to care,
more about the distribution of power and authority than the content of the
human rights rules themselves. In fact, many of these opponents often
couple their federal and state sovereignty arguments with the observation
that the United States is already largely voluntarily compliant with international human rights and consequently has no need for additional protections
or oversight.19
The International Federalists’ high water mark culminated in the proposed 1952 Bricker Amendment. This amendment sought to limit the
reach of international treaties by dictating that “[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law . . . only through legislation by Congress which it
could enact under its delegated powers in the absence of such a treaty.”20
While this proposed constitutional amendment failed, International Federalists forced President Eisenhower to commit to not adhere to future human rights treaties to pacify amendment supporters.21 Although senatorial
support for this viewpoint has waxed and waned over time, adherents of
this view have thus far succeeded in blocking ratification of the CEDAW
and CRC.22
18. John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural Defense of
Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2237-39 (1999). President Carter urged the
adoption of a reservation recognizing state sovereignty. Transmittal Letter, 14 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 395 (Feb. 23, 1978) (referring to Letter of Submittal, Dep’t of State, Dec.
17, 1977); Letter from Warren Christopher, Deputy Sec’y of State, to President James Carter (Dec. 17, 1977), reprinted in U.S. RATIFICATION OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS TREATES: WITH
OR WITHOUT RESERVATIONS? 88, 96 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1981). The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has in fact been ratified subject to an understanding of
the same import. Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 9 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M.
645, 652; see also Aya Gruber, Who’s Afraid of Geneva Law?, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1017,
1075-84 (2007) (debating the federalist argument that international treaties should “be presumptively non-self-executing in order to preserve state rights”); Barbara Stark, Economic
Rights in the United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an “Entirely New
Strategy”, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 79, 82, 91 (1992) (noting that the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has not been ratified because of concerns of its impact
on state sovereignty).
19. See Jack Goldsmith, International Human Rights Law & the United States Double
Standard, 1 GREEN BAG 365, 371-72 (1998).
20. KAUFMAN, supra note 13, at 30-31.
21. Louis B. Sohn, United States Attitudes Toward Ratification of Human Rights Instruments, 20 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 255, 260 (1990).
22. See SRINI SITARAMAN, STATE PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL TREATY REGIMES
197-204 (2009); John Fonte, ‘The World is My Constituency’: Are Liberals Rejecting the
Liberal-Internationalist Tradition?, NAT’L REV., Nov. 17, 2008, at 44.
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One might suggest the International Federalists are in fact merely using
structural arguments as a cover to mask their more substantive objections.23
For instance, many of those who most strongly favored the Bricker
Amendment feared that other countries would force the United States to
change segregationist behavior which they believed to be legitimate as a
matter of principle. They would likely have resisted domestic change
enacted through structurally legitimate channels as strongly as they did
calls from international actors.24 Regardless of the ultimate source of their
opposition, it is worth identifying this as a distinct influence on the political
behavior of federal actors. Even if some of the time these arguments are
mere smoke screens, they can still constrain executive and legislative behavior.
The second camp which I term “Positive Rights Rejecters,”—
sometimes, though not always, aligned with the first—resists much of the
content of international human rights law. While often presented as a monolithic structure, foundational international law documents contain at least
five basic categories of human rights. These include: (1) rights of the person such as life, liberty, and security of the person; (2) rights associated
with the rule of law; (3) political rights such as freedom of expression, assembly, and association; (4) economic and social rights which refer to an
adequate standard of living; and (5) rights of communities.25 Many countries find the wide variety of such rights uncontroversial and enshrine them
in their constitutions.26 The U.S. Constitution, however, creates very few,
if any, obligations on the government to provide social services or community rights.27 Similarly, the U.S. Legislature has not seen fit to recognize

23. Thanks to Steve Gey for this observation. See also Catherine Powell, CEDAW, Federalism, and Democracy in U.S. International Lawmaking, OPINIO JURIS, Mar. 21, 2008,
http://opiniojuris.org/2008/03/21/cedaw-federalism-and-democracy-in-us-internationallawmaking/ (suggesting opponents use federalism arguments in lieu of their actual substantive objections).
24. See David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 579, 585 (2002) (observing that those lodging anti-treaty federalism arguments “principally had racial segregation in mind”); Judith Resnick, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564,
1578 (2006) (“[A] specific premise of the American constitutional agreement to ‘split the
atom of power’ was that it enabled slavery to survive, if not flourish. States claimed a sovereign prerogative to determine which persons were recognized as legally entitled to the
sanctity of their own bodies and the fruits of their own labors.”).
25. Charles R. Beitz, Human Rights as a Common Concern, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 269,
271 (2001).
26. Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees?, in AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS 90, 91 (Michael Ignatieff
ed., 2005).
27. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
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many of these categories of rights, as it sees them as unjustified extensions
of the government’s role, unduly costly, or as correlative with socialist
forces.28
Positive Rights Rejecters argue for substantive minimalism, suggesting
that human rights concerns should be limited to forcible intrusions on bodily security29 or, slightly more broadly, other limitations on the government’s relationship with the individual.30 They shy away from the creation
of positive obligations for the federal government. Such individuals might
raise the philosophical objection that governments only exist to protect
negative liberty.31 Similarly, they contend social and economic rights do
not actually exist because they believe rights, properly defined, must correspond to obligations.32 Since they find international law lacks meaningful definitions of the content of governments’ obligations associated with
such rights, they view economic and social claims as mere aspirations or
preferences.
Positive Rights Rejecters also voice more pragmatic objections. Even if
the state might be permitted to undertake an expansive role in enforcing a
maximalist view of human rights, it ought not do so because, in practice,
implementing a broader set of rights usurps the limited resources available
to monitor and enforce the more narrow set of “negative” human rights.33
They contend that in a time of limited fiscal resources, international human
rights treaties fail to respect the delicate resource balancing that must occur. Similarly, assuming that the state may properly engage in positive
rights enforcing, using international law to broadly define human rights
may use legal language to mask mere political judgments at the expense of
meaningful political deliberation.34
Such a view need not lead to a universal rejection of international human
rights law. For instance, Positive Rights Rejecters may embrace those treaties that restrict the state’s power, such as the Convention Against Torture
28. Sunstein, supra note 26, at 92 (identifying various explanations).
29. Joshua Cohen, Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?, 12
J. POL. PHIL. 190, 192 (2004). Cohen rejects this view. Id. at 191.
30. Such a view is consistent with the Supreme Court’s reluctance to recognize welfare
rights such as financial assistance, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 (1970); housing, Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); education, Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982); and health care, see Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, State Constitutionalism and the Right
to Health Care 3-21 (Aug. 12, 2009) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1421504 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink)).
31. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 198, 210-213 (1980); Maurice
Cranston, Are There Any Human Rights?, 112 DAEDALUS 1 (2003).
32. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1919).
33. Cohen, supra note 29, at 193.
34. Id.
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and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”).
Yet, the United States has long resisted those human rights treaties that
promise social and economic rights such as the International Convention on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families.35
Even when the United States signs and ratifies international human rights
law, Positive Rights Rejecters have been wary of the creation of any specific judicially enforceable rights stemming from those treaties.36
A third group, “Flexible Foreign Policy Advocates” object not to the
domestic effects of human rights treaties or the role of the government in
securing those rights, but rather to the possible limitations that supporting
international human rights places on our ability to conduct foreign policy.
While adherents to this group might like, or at least be neutral on, the inherent benefits of human rights at home, they suggest that the United States’
support for particular human rights treaties might complicate diplomacy,
requiring delicate political maneuvering.37 Such concerns might motivate
people on either side of the political aisle; the decision of whether to engage or contain human rights violators is not a purely partisan one.
Despite the combined forces of such arguments and political supporters,
countervailing positions also influence the political process. For instance,
the group of individuals I identify as “Foreign Human Rights Promoters”
strongly supports the United States’ adherence to multilateral efforts to
strengthen human rights. Foreign Human Rights Promoters can count as
their success such actions as the United States’ membership in, and active
support for, the UDHR as a mechanism to export constitutional values
abroad.38 In addition, the United States belongs to four of the major U.N.
human rights treaties, including the ICCPR, the Convention Against All

35. Benjamin Mason Meier & Larisa M. Mori, The Highest Attainable Standard: Advancing a Collective Human Right to Public Health, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 101, 128
n.112 (2005); Amnesty International, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Questions and
Answers, http://www.amnestyusa.org/escr/files/escr_qa.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
36. See generally Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning “Self-Executing” and “Non-Self-Executing” Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 515
(1991).
37. See Theodor Meron, The Time Has Come for the United States to Ratify Geneva
Protocol I, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 678 (1994) (discussing similar concerns in the context of an
international humanitarian law treaty).
38. See PHILIPPE SANDS, LAWLESS WORLD: AMERICA AND THE MAKING AND BREAKING
OF GLOBAL RULES FROM FDR’S ATLANTIC CHARTER TO GEORGE W. BUSH’S LAWLESS WAR
(2005).
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Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Torture,39 and the
Genocide Convention.40 The U.S. also strongly supported the United Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993.41 More recently, President Obama signed the International Disability Treaty and is
asking for Senate ratification.42 He also identified the CEDAW as one of
the top three U.N. treaties he would like to see ratified during his term and
has created an ambassador for women’s rights in the State Department.43
Yet even the Foreign Human Rights Promoters have often viewed international human rights law as a way to extol the exceptionalism of America.
They seem to believe that we already know and understand how governments should treat their citizens and we need only find effective mechanisms for transporting those approaches.44 Foreign Human Rights Promoters have little interest in changing domestic law to conform to international
law or in creating judicially enforceable rights that would stem from these
treaties.
Given these various constituencies, it should be no surprise that internal
critique and change of domestic human rights progress has been less than
forthcoming. Domestic support for human rights has generally been directed as a way to improve external, rather than internal, conditions.45 As
discussed in more detail below, both the U.S. government and domestic
NGOs produced extensive information on global compliance with human
rights treaties.46 Such information may have spurred externally-oriented
human rights legislation, such as the government’s practice of linking eco39. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20, at 20, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force June 26, 1987).
40. Other important memberships include the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (entered into force Oct. 4, 1967); International Labour Organization, Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, adopted June 25, 1957, ILO
No. 105, 320 U.N.T.S. 291; Slavery, Servitude, Forced Labour and Similar Institutions and
Practices Convention of 1926, Sept. 25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 L.N.T.S. 253.
41. ROBERT F. DRINAN, THE MOBILIZATION OF SHAME: A WORLD VIEW OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 16 (2001).
42. Nancy Langer, UN Disabilities Treaty Deserves Support, BALT. SUN, Aug. 2, 2009,
at 23A.
43. Megan Carpentier, A New State of Mind, MS., Spring 2009, at 42.
44. Golove, supra note 24, at 579; see also Book Note, Are American Human Rights
Groups Exceptional in Their Silence?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 631, 636 & n.20 (2005).
45. RICHARD A. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS HORIZONS: THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 38-39 (2000).
46. Kenneth Cmiel, The Emergence of Human Rights Politics in the United States, 86 J.
AM. HIST. 1231, 1241 (1999) (quoting the Washington Post’s observation that human rights
legislation “would probably not have passed except for ‘the large volume of detailed information that has become available to American lawmakers about just how badly many of
Washington’s client states are abusing their own citizens.’”).
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nomic assistance on other countries’ human rights performances.47 The
emphasis on political and civil rights, as opposed to economic rights, both
kept with domestic commitments and allowed criticism of cold war adversaries.48
Recently, a fifth camp, “Domestic Human Rights Integrators,” who emphasize the need for human rights at home as well as abroad, have become
a meaningful part of the political landscape. Supporters of this view can
lay claim to some small federal-level victories. For instance, the federal
government has undertaken some review of its own practices in the past
twenty years, demonstrating an increased commitment to its obligations
under human rights treaties. This includes the 1994 State Department efforts to draft the Shattuck report to satisfy the ICCPR,49 and the submission
of its first report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in 2001.50 Similarly, in 2002, the United States began to allow outside
observers to report on its domestic human rights practices to the U.N. Human Rights Council.51 This openness has also included a 2007 visit from
the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights.52 Yet, outside of treaty compliance reports, the federal and state governments have done little to directly demonstrate their support for the domestic internalization of international human rights treaties.53

47. Id. at 1241-42.
48. FALK, supra note 45, at 58.
49. CCPR, INITIAL REPORTS OF STATES PARTIES DUE IN 1993: UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Addendum (Aug. 24, 1994), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
133836.pdf. Both NGOs and the U.N. Commission on Human Rights used this report to
strongly criticize domestic policies such as the mistreatment of immigrants. DRINAN, supra
note 41, at 28-30; Daniel Wessner, From Judge to Participant: The United States as Champion of Human Rights, in DEBATING HUMAN RIGHTS: CRITICAL ESSAYS FROM THE UNITED
STATES AND ASIA 255, 269 (Peter Van Ness ed., 1999).
50. U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 59th Sess., 1475th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/SR.1475 (2001).
51. These external observations include a report on migrants’ human rights. Gabriela
Rodríguez Pizarro, Human Rights of Migrants: Mission to the Border between Mexico and
the
United
States
of
America,
(Oct.
31,
2002),
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/2848af408d01ec0ac1256b09004e770b/5b6e3
e148f22c3fbc1256c8e00335f80/$FILE/g0215399.doc. For a more recent report, see, e.g.,
Arjun Sengupta, Extreme Poverty and Human Rights—A Mission Report on the United
States
30-31
(Jan.
6,
2007)
(unpublished
manuscript,
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=961230 (follow “One-Click Download” hyperlink)).
52. Press Release, United Nations, Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of Migrants
Ends Visit to the United States (May 17, 2007), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/
huricane.nsf/0/BA409950651325ECC12572E2002845A5?opendocument.
53. LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST 2001: HUMAN
RIGHTS POLICIES FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 106 (2001).
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Domestic Human Rights Integrators are just beginning to coalesce efforts to bring human rights home. These efforts include the U.S. Human
Rights Network, founded in 2002,54 which seeks to increase the capacity
and visibility of the U.S. human rights movement as well as strengthen
links between and among domestic and international human rights issues
and groups.55 Most notably, the Human Rights Network’s activities includes a Katrina initiative “dedicated to ensuring that all levels of the U.S.
government comply with its domestic and international legal obligations
and norms concerning the rights and protections accorded to persons displaced by natural disaster.”56 On other fronts, schools including the University of Chicago and Columbia University have expanded their joint action and academic programs to include an exploration of domestic human
rights at home.57 Similarly, with the ushering in of a new administration,
the American Constitution Society crafted a policy blueprint for human
rights. This proposal promotes federal-level changes such as an executive
order to “reconstitute and revitalize an Interagency Working Group on
Human Rights which will serve as a coordinating body among federal
agencies and departments for the promotion and respect of human rights
and the implementation of human rights obligations in U.S. domestic policy,” act on specific treaty obligations, create a national human rights commission, ratify outstanding human rights treaties, and undertake reviews of
harmful reservations, understandings, and declarations in already-ratified
human rights treaties.58 Legal scholars are increasingly focusing on this
issue with several symposia devoted to the idea of bringing international
law home.59

54. US Human Rights Network, About Us–History, http://www.ushrnetwork.org/aboutus-history (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
55. US
Human
Rights
Network,
Core
Principles
&
Goals,
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/about-us-core-principles-goals (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). It
also conducts training sessions and is launching a human rights mapping and database
project to gain a comprehensive picture of the work of its members. US Human Rights Network, USHRN Launching Human Rights Mapping and Documentation Project,
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/mapping_db (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
56. US Human Rights Network, Hold the US Accountable: The US Human Rights Network’s
Internally
Displaced
Persons
(IDP)
Human
Rights
Campaign,
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/projects-katrina (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
57. See Center for the Study of Human Rights, http://www.hrcolumbia.org/ (last visited
Feb. 22, 2010); The University of Chicago Human Rights Program, Projects,
http://humanrights.uchicago.edu/projects.shtml (last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
58. CATHERINE POWELL, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y FOR LAW & POLICY, HUMAN RIGHTS
AT HOME: A DOMESTIC POLICY BLUEPRINT FOR THE NEW ADMINISTRATION 3-5 (2008).
59. In addition to this volume, see also Human Rights in the United States: A Special
Issue Celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the Human Rights Institute at Columbia Law
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Yet the Domestic Human Rights Integrators have not focused exclusively on forcing federal ratification or passing national legislation. CEDAW
and other human rights treaties are not high priority agenda items for the
President or the Legislature. Rather, many of those concerned with human
rights choose to focus on local action instead. This next subsection seeks
to explain why this is an important choice.
B.

Linking the Political to the Structural and Procedural

These competing political approaches alone are insufficient to explain
the significant difficulty entailed in federal human rights action. Treaties
also face a host of structural barriers that hamper ratification.60 Though
popular and bipartisan treaties often easily surmount these obstacles, they
can make the passage of treaties that raise the ire of the political factions
mentioned above quite difficult. First, the President has a de facto absolute
veto over treaties. Unless he decides to sign a treaty, it cannot move forward, even if the Senate strongly supports it.61 Unlike the legislative veto,
which Congress can override by a two-thirds vote in both branches, the
President’s implicit treaty veto is final. Exercising this de facto veto is also
less costly because the refusal to sign is in many instances a political nonevent requiring substantially less political capital than the active decision to
veto legislation that has already passed through Congress.62
Second, while the refusal to sign can block a treaty, the President cannot
create any commitment to ratify through signing.63 At best, mere signature
creates an obligation “to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and
purpose of the treaty”;64 at worst, it only asks a state to avoid undertaking
an action which would hamper full compliance once the treaty has entered
into domestic force.65 So the various presidents who have signed several
core human rights treaties such as the International Covenant on Economic,
School, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. (2008); Catherine Powell, International Law and the
Constitution: Terms of Engagement, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 399 (2008).
60. A possible end run is to reconstrue treaties as executive agreements, but I do not address this possibility as the major human rights documents have already been presented as
treaties rather than executive agreements.
61. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2, cl. 2.
62. This observation may not always hold true, particularly in the case of the pocket veto.
63. Harvard Research in International Law, Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 653, 769
(noting that a signature creates no state obligation to ratify a treaty).
64. Curtis A. Bradley, Unratified Treaties, Domestic Politics, and the U.S. Constitution,
48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 307, 307 (2007). This obligation is reflected in Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, which the U.S. has not rejected and which might be
viewed as customary international law. Id. at 307-08.
65. ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 94 (2000).

WEXLER CHRISTENSEN

614

4/29/2010 7:07 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVII

Social and Cultural Rights (1977), the American Convention on Human
Rights (1977), CEDAW (1980), and the CRC (1995), have watched them
languish for decades.66
Moreover, the newly emerging presidential power to unsign a treaty67
creates another related, if mostly theoretical,68 barrier to treaty ratification.
Though this power has only been exercised once,69 some have urged the
unsigning of human rights treaties such as the CRC and the International
Labour Organization Convention on Race Discrimination in Employment.70 If presidents decide to use this power more frequently, it means
one president cannot preserve a future president’s political capital or bypass a future president’s de facto veto. In other words, the questionable exercise of one president’s power to unsign a treaty might force a future president to resign the treaty if he wants it to move through the Senate. This
means that a sitting president that faces a hostile senate cannot guarantee
his signing leaves a treaty in the Senate’s hands in case political fortunes
realign with a hostile president and friendly senate. Nor can a president
even lock in a commitment to act consistently with the purposes of the treaty, as unsigning is a complete exit that frees all domestic actors from any
possible treaty-based restraints.71
Finally, the constitutional decision to vest treaty passage in the Senate
also weighs against the passage of progressive human rights treaties. Unlike the House of Representatives, the Senate is designed to be “less responsive to emerging political trends” through six-year terms and a cycling
of elections that places only one-third of the seats up in each election.72

66. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, adopted Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3
(signed by the U.S. on Feb. 16, 1995); Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (signed
by the U.S. on July 17, 1980); American Convention on Human Rights, adopted Nov. 22,
1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (signed by the U.S. on Jan. 6, 1977); International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3
(signed by the U.S. on Oct. 5, 1977).
67. See Curtis Bradley, U.S. Announces Intent Not to Ratify International Criminal
Court Treaty, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., May 2002, http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh87.htm.
68. Only time will tell if future presidents will choose to exercise this power.
69. See Letter from John R. Bolton, Under Sec’y of State for Arms Control and Int’l
Sec., to Kofi Annan, UN Sec’y Gen., (May 6, 2002), available at
http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/05/06/court.letter.text/index.html (announcing the President’s decision to unsign the Rome Statute which creates the International Criminal Court’s
jurisdiction).
70. See Edward T. Swaine, Unsigning, 55 STAN. L. REV. 2061, 2064 (2003).
71. Id. at 2082-83.
72. Tara Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 123 HARV. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2010); see GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERAL-
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This status quo bias does not block all, or even nearly all, treaties, but it
makes those treaties that step ahead of social or political consensus difficult
to pass. Other Senate-specific structural barriers include Rule 22, which
permits a single member to filibuster a treaty unless sixty percent of the
Senate supports a cloture vote.73 In addition to the general filibuster problem, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee possesses absolute control
over whether and when a treaty comes to the floor for debate. Even if the
Chair supports the treaty, other members can prevent a treaty from reaching
the floor because the Committee cannot meet without a quorum.74
I conclude this section by noting that while treaties are the most aggressive mechanism for human rights to pass into the federal domestic arena,
other national mechanisms exist.75 These include the legislative creation of
national human rights institutions or passage of other human-rightsoriented legislation. Other legislative activity faces similar political hurdles, though not necessarily identical structural hurdles. I focus here
though on treaties because Congress has never passed the equivalent of
domestic-implementing legislation for treaties that have failed to make it
through the political process. Though the Legislature might pass something that is substantively similar to the treaties’ domestic requirements,
such human rights legislation has not been offered as an alternative or a
supplement.76 In the section below, I offer some reasons why cities might
be better situated to take such action.
II. THE PROMISE AND PERIL OF CITIES
When the federal government is a reluctant first mover, many have suggested moving to the sub-federal as a second-best option. This section ex-

ISM,

POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS
27 (2002).
73. United States Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Rules of the Senate,
Rule XXII Precedence of Motions, http://rules.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII
(last visited Feb. 22, 2010).
74. See Kenneth A. Shepsle & Barry R. Weingast, The Institutional Foundations of
Committee Power, 81 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 85 (1987).
75. Executive efforts, such as President Clinton’s efforts to conduct human rights reviews, also present another national strategy. These reviews, however, were parasitic on the
underlying human rights treaties. I have discussed elsewhere why the president may be
constitutionally limited in efforts to use purely executive efforts to make an end run around
a Senate unwilling to ratify a treaty. See Wexler, supra note 2, at 17 (discussing such mechanisms in the context of the Kyoto Protocol).
76. Even the Obama administration has not framed key agenda items as human rights
issues, regardless of their consistency with human rights treaties. For instance, the administration has never suggested that health care is a human right as contained by the International Convention on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights.

WEXLER CHRISTENSEN

616

4/29/2010 7:07 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVII

plores the reasons why some types of cities may be well positioned for the
domestic integration of human rights norms. Integration is often more politically feasible at the local level than that at the federal or even state level.
Reasons for this include, but are not limited to, political homogeneity, the
avoidance of federalism and foreign policy concerns, and a more favorable
structural environment that can facilitate passage of progressive proposals.
Not all cities, however, are equally likely to adopt human rights ordinances
and, thus, I try to explain what types of cities are most likely to act given
the political feasibility features mentioned above.
This enthusiasm for local action, however, must be tempered with a serious discussion of the structural constraints on local behavior. This section addresses both the federal and state governments’ authority and propensity to limit the behavior of cities. It also tempers the enthusiasm of my
earlier work in this area by highlighting the limitations on state, federal,
and international spillover. Just as not all cities are likely to adopt human
rights ordinances, even if cities have successful, flourishing human rights
infrastructures, states and the federal government may be unlikely to follow
suit.
***
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Typology

A brief typology of human rights ordinances may prove to be helpful as
human rights legislation and ordinances come in all shapes and sizes. I begin with what might be labeled as purely expressive human rights ordinances.77 Such ordinances express the city’s solidarity with some piece of
international law. In so doing, they might also criticize the state or federal
government’s non-compliance with such international law. For instance,
Berkeley’s 2002 Resolution to Oppose the Patriot Act, Justice Department
Directives, and Executive Orders that Prevent the Protection of Civil
Rights and Liberties affirms U.N. Charter Article 55 but does not commit
the city to any new course of action.78 The resolution merely reiterates the
city’s support for existing constitutional policies and disavows federal activity.79 Similarly, in February 2009, Berkeley passed an ordinance disavowing the U.S. practice of giving juveniles sentences of life without parole.80 Berkeley based its opposition on, among other things, international
human rights law.81 Yet Berkeley neither has nor pretends to have any
control over federal or state criminal sentencing practices.82
Second, cities might pass ordinances that are more than purely expressive, but do not themselves create any enforceable rights. Ordinances prohibiting state officials from voluntarily complying with federal immigration
enforcement laws might serve as an example.83 Individual immigrants
would not have a private right of action for violations, but it may enable the

77. These might also be deemed “political graffiti” in the words of Richard Briffault.
Richard Briffault, Remarks at the Fordham Urban Law Journal Cooper-Walsh Colloquium
on Empowered Cities: The Emergence of Cities as Autonomous Actors (Oct. 30, 2009).
78. Berkeley, Cal., Resolution to Oppose the Patriot Act, Justice Department Directives
and Executive Orders that Prevent the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties (July 23,
2002), available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/citycouncil/2002citycouncil/packet/
072302/2002-07-23%20Item%2031.pdf; see also Santa Cruz, Cal., Resolution 26.032, Resolution to Oppose the Patriot Act, Justice Department Directives and Executive Orders that
Prevent the Protection of Civil Rights and Liberties (Nov. 12, 2002).
79. Berkeley, Cal., Resolution, supra note 78.
80. See Letter from Jesse Arreguin, Councilmember, Berkeley, Cal., to Jennifer Granholm, Governor, Mich., (Feb. 10, 2009) available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/uploaded
Files/Clerk/Level_3_-_City_Council/2009/02Feb/2009-02-10%20Item%2011%20Letter%
20Supporting%20the%20Release%20of%20Efren%20Paredes,%20Jr.pdf.
81. Id.
82. In another example, Chapel Hill’s endorsement of the UDHR explicitly states that
the city is not joining or creating a treaty, but merely providing a declaration of principles. A
Resolution Adopting the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as Guiding Principles
(2009), available at http://townhall.townofchapelhill.org/agendas/2009/11/23/5p/5p-200911-23_r11.pdf.
83. See, e.g., Rose Cuison Villazor, “Sanctuary Cities” and Local Citizenship, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 573 (2010) (examining San Francisco sanctuary law).
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future acquisition of positive rights such as those that flow from citizenship.84 Another example might be human rights impact statement reviews
that create procedural but not substantive obligations.
Relatedly, cities might participate in treaty mechanisms either formally
or informally. For instance, Berkeley’s City Council recently voted to “report to the U.N. on the city’s compliance with treaties on civil liberties, racial discrimination and torture.”85 While the city is not formally a member
of these treaties, as a subcomponent of the United States, it is expressing its
support for federal membership and any duties that might implicate city
behavior as well as generating information to judge federal compliance.
Yet, an individual would have no entitlement nor redress under these local
procedures.
Third, cities might pass ordinances which use international human rights
concepts and treaties to reform city behavior. The most frequently cited
example, and one which I have discussed at length elsewhere, is San Francisco’s local CEDAW ordinance, which implements the treaty’s principles
without actually participating in treaty organizations or governance.86 So
far, San Francisco has completed CEDAW-mandated gender analyses of
six city departments. The gender analysis included a “framework to evaluate and address any differential impact of service delivery, employment
practices, and budget allocation.”87 As a result of these analyses, the following changes were made: better allocation of resources to female offenders in juvenile probation; increased and improved collection of gender disaggregated data; changed placements of streetlights and sidewalk cuts;
expansion of sexual harassment training; enhanced flexibility in meeting
vendor requirements for women; and greater appointments of women to

84. See, e.g., Jesse McKinley, San Francisco Alters When Police Must Report Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2009, at A19 (describing a bill passed by the San Francisco
board of supervisors preventing deportation of juveniles arrested on felony charges until
conviction).
85. Posting
of
Heather
Ross
to
Daily
Californian,
http://blog.dailycal.org/news/tag/berkeley-city-council (Sept. 30, 2009, 11:38 PST).
86. Stacy Laira Lozner, Diffusion of Local Regulatory Innovations: The San Francisco
CEDAW Ordinance and the New York City Human Rights Initiative, 104 COLUM. L. REV.
768, 768, 776-84 (2004). It was later amended to reflect the principles of the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Discrimination (a treaty that the U.S. ratified but
has not implemented).
87. Emily M. Murase, Ph.D., Executive Director, San Francisco Dep’t on the Status of
Women, Testimony at N.Y. City Council’s Governmental Operations Comm. Human Rights
GOAL Hearing (Apr. 8, 2005), available at http://www.nychri.org/documents/Murase.pdf.
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revenue-creating commissions.88 Influenced by San Francisco, other cities
and states are promoting similar initiatives.89
These human-rights-influenced actions might include the creation of
human rights commissions or human rights ombudsmen. For instance, the
city of Eugene, Oregon has taken a model from abroad, discussed in more
detail below, and designated itself a “human rights city.”90 So far, its human rights code includes a ban on a variety of discriminatory behaviors
that far surpasses federal protections in housing, employment, and city contracting.91 Eugene’s efforts include proactive efforts to prevent, rather than
to merely remedy, discrimination, including unintentional or passive discrimination.
Fourth, cities can create positive rights through ordinances. As a practical matter, it is important to note that cities actually are increasingly
adopting local measures “that regulate individual rights, social welfare, and
other measures traditionally thought as within the purview of the states.”92
For instance, Bloomington, Indiana might recognize the right to a living
wage by mandating covered employers pay above the federal minimum
wage to covered workers.93 Similarly, Eugene’s human rights city program
also hopes to speak to the full range of human rights, including political,
cultural, social, and economic rights. Eugene aspires to make human rights
“a central part of every City program” by “striv[ing] to systematically include human rights values in proposing or considering new legislation; in
88. Krishanti Dharmaraj, WILD For Human Rights, Testimony at N.Y. City Council’s
Governmental Operations Comm. Human Rights GOAL Hearing (Apr. 8, 2005), available
at http://www.nychri.org/documents/Dharmara.pdf.
89. Both Los Angeles and Chicago have passed similar CEDAW ordinances. Efforts
are also underway in Seattle, Palo Alto, Santa Cruz County, and Santa Clara. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly on December 18, 1979, and Signed on Behalf of the United States
of America on July 17, 1980: Hearing Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 107th Cong.
105 (2002) (statement submitted by the National Education Association), available at
http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/107s/80461.pdf.
90. See Eugene, Oregon, The Human Rights City Project, www.humanrightscity.com
(last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
91. See City of Eugene Human Rights Commission, http://www.eugene-or.gov/portal/
server.pt?open=335&qid=50709979&rank=1&parentname=SearchResult&parentid=5&
mode=2&in_hi_userid=2&cahed=true (last visited Mar. 25, 2010) (including family status,
marital status, and sexual orientation).
92. Richard C. Schragger, Can Strong Mayors Empower Weak Cities? On the Power of
Local Executives in a Federal System, 115 YALE L.J. 2542, 2574 (2006).
93. City of Bloomington, Living Wage Ordinance, http://bloomington.in.gov/sections/
viewSection.php?section_id=79 (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). The city passed it through its
human rights commission, and advocates that support it use human-rights-based arguments.
See Milton Fisk: Human Rights and Living Wages, http://www.miltonfisk.org/writings/
human-rights-and-living-wages/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
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the design, implementation, and evaluation of policies and programs; in the
course of making budgetary decisions; and in developing and diversifying
its human resources.”94 These human rights programs are likely the priciest programs and the most taxing on a city’s limited resources. In the
next sections, I will use this typology both to explain which kinds of cities
are likely to pass such policies, and to assess the spillover constraints of local human rights ordinances.
B.

Optimizing the Intersection of Political and Structural
1.

Maximizing Political Homogeneity

One reason we should expect to see more treaty-influenced human rights
behavior at the local level is because some, though certainly not all, cities
contain politically homogenous populations. While the state of California
contains so many varied interests that commentators have suggested splitting the state into two (or even three) entities, relatively speaking, those
who reside in San Francisco or Berkeley tend to share much more aligned
interests and preferences. Both small and large cities can possess enough
political homogeneity to pass legislation that would encounter greater difficulty at the state or federal level. Though large cities often contain diverse
populations, they tend to have more voter interest convergence than the
state in which they are located or than the federal population as a whole.
For instance, recent maps of electoral politics demonstrate that while states
as a whole tend to look purple with their mixed political views, individual
cities seem to be strongly blue or red.95 If substantive objections are what
really blocks the ratification of human rights treaties, then the strong political homogeneity of at least some cities should make the passage of such
proposals more likely.
Relatedly, for those cities whose ideological preferences align with the
treaty preferences, they can use human rights proposals to successfully
compete for and retain citizens. Charles Tiebout has suggested that cities
compete for residents on the basis of their provision of social services.96
While citizens might desire the efficient delivery of services, they also pay

94. Human Rights City, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.humanrightscity.com/
Human_Rights_City_Project/FAQs.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
95. Robert J. Vanderbei, Election 2004 Results, http://www.princeton.edu/~rvdb/JAVA/
election2004/ (last visited Feb. 22, 2010) (see 3-D maps).
96. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416,
418-20 (1956).
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attention to the specific bundle of services provided.97 Just as people might
be concerned about school districts or the rate of local taxes, they might also care about the way in which cities frame and describe such services.
The local integration of human rights treaties can encompass the provision
of new services that the government has not offered before, new mechanisms of accountability for local government, as well as a new language for
understanding the role of the city in the life of its citizens. Thus, cities that
believe its constituents will prefer such policies have a strong reason to innovate or mimic them.
Of course, Tiebout’s insight that individuals move to localities in order
to satisfy their preferences for public policies is often overstated. Agglomeration theory suggests instead that many individuals, along with the
businesses they work in, move to localities, particularly large cities, in order to capture the efficiency and information gains of having lots of neighbors.98 Thus, while the package of city services may matter strongly to
some individuals, others may care about them only after satisfying their
preferences for efficiency and information gains. In some instances, those
city services and structures may matter very little.99 Yet for some cities,
like New York and San Francisco, this combination of Tieboutian individuals and agglomerative individuals may actually cut in favor of the passage
and retention of aggressive human rights policies. Those most likely to oppose expansive economic rights and other progressive policies often find
they are unwilling or unable to successfully threaten exit because they gain
more from their particular agglomeration of neighbors than they lose from
local policy.100 For instance, a business that dislikes a human rights living
wage ordinance but has location-specific investments may find itself unable
or unwilling to move.
On the other hand, if certain businesses are able, and do in fact, move
from relatively friendly cities as these ordinances increase costs to cities
abroad, violations may actually accelerate as the businesses will not be sub97. See Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1498-99 (1987) (book review of RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE
FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987), noting that families may move to a community to access its
school system).
98. See EDWARD L. GLAESER, CITIES, AGGLOMERATION AND SPATIAL EQUILIBRIUM
(2008).
99. Another reason one might want support on the local level is that it provides an alternative to the burgeoning rhetoric of competition. Many cities are downplaying their public
features and instead emphasizing a business model of the city with individuals as clients and
administrators as managers. Schragger, supra note 92, at 2552-53.
100. David Schleicher, The City as a Law and Economic Subject, U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 6, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
1471555 (follow “One-Click Dowload” hyperlink)).
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ject to any meaningful constraints. For instance, if Los Angeles were to
enact child labor ordinances based on the CRC that created protections
above and beyond existing federal and state protections, sweatshops might
move out of Los Angeles to a city (or country) less protective than Los Angeles pre-ordinance.101 Sweatshops do not need the particular knowledge
or transportation or set of neighbors unique to Los Angeles; it is easy for
them to locate anywhere, though transportation costs increase if they move
out of the country. Such relocation might be more than an equal swap because the capital accumulation due to the lax human rights environment
may further discourage that city or country from ratifying human rights
treaties or from adopting human-rights-friendly policies.102
2.

Avoiding Federalism and Foreign Policy Concerns

Local implementation also avoids the ire of International Federalists and
Flexible Foreign Policy Advocates. Although I identify a variety of political objections to the federal integration of human rights, the public as a
whole seems to support the idea of human rights and much of their substantive content. Opinion survey data reveals that more than eighty percent of
the domestic population believes that America should strive to uphold human rights at home for those that are being denied those rights.103 When
asked more specific questions to gauge their commitments, large majorities
support issues such as equality, fairness, and freedom from mistreatment
(as well as their framing as human rights),104 though economic rights such
as freedom from poverty and adequate healthcare receive less support.105
Even so, two-thirds of Americans believe that the government should both
protect and provide human rights even when it means expanding government assistance.106 Yet the same data suggests that nearly half of Americans believe that sovereignty concerns should preclude U.S. membership in
human rights treaties, and more than half believe that divergent cultures
and values prevent the possibility of universally applicable human rights.107

101. I am indebted to David Schleicher for this example.
102. See Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1966-72 (2007) (suggesting such a problem in the case of
state and local regulation of environmental problems).
103. THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE U.S.: OPINION RESEARCH WITH
ADVOCATES, JOURNALISTS, AND THE GENERAL PUBLIC 3 (2007).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 4.
106. Id. at 5.
107. Id. at 6. This includes a high percentage of African Americans and Hispanics, often
the most likely to benefit from human rights at home. Id. at 10. In fact, those most suppor-
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Thus, if international federalism is driving the federal debate over human rights, city level passage should be unproblematic, since it neither
binds the country to participating in international governance, nor allows
the federal government to aggrandize its powers vis-à-vis sub-federal units.
In addition, local integration does not force constituents to address thorny
issues such as how the language and substance of human rights should apply abroad. Arguments about cultural relativism have substantially less salience when one is only talking about a domestic population. For instance,
if Eugene, Oregon becomes a human rights city with a particularized notion
of what constitutes gender discrimination and includes gender stereotyping,
it need not deeply grapple over whether that interpretation is consistent
with how other countries view gender discrimination or whether it properly
respects other cultures.108
Relatedly, city integration avoids the dilemma of Flexible Foreign Policy
Advocates as cities lack the foreign policy concerns of federal actors.
While cities may seek international business or global social relationships,
the constitution, as discussed below, generally bars them from explicitly
conducting foreign affairs.109 Many scholars have noted this as a constraint, such as in the Burma procurement policies, but in other ways, it is
also liberating. Domestic integration sends no direct message about the direction of the country, though it may send a signal about the possibility of
change. Cities need not worry as much about what message or example
they set for other actors, nor need they worry that it will rupture preexisting
relationships or irritate certain sets of international political actors. For instance, if San Francisco affirms the U.N. Human Rights Charter, a country
will be hard-pressed to use that to criticize the United States for taking or
not taking a particular position on a complicated international issue, such as
the relationship between the Israeli government and Palestinians. Similarly, in interpreting treaty language or treaty concepts, cities need not concern themselves with whether their potentially idiosyncratic interpretations
will be debated at treaty meetings, derided by foreign countries, or used to
criticize third-party nation-states who do not agree with the city’s interpretation.

tive of a domestic human rights agenda include the vast majority of African Americans and
those with incomes below $25,000. Id. at 21.
108. Of course, a city may face particularized local instances when those questions are
raised, but I assume those are less pervasive than having to address the law’s application in
a foreign cultural context. In other words, determining whether a gender stereotyping law
ought to apply to an individual Muslim’s hiring practices in a U.S. city is much less difficult
than the federal government determining whether a Muslim country must have the same
gender stereotyping laws under an antidiscrimination treaty as the United States.
109. See infra Part II.C.1.a.
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Enhancing Warm Glow and Direct Gains

Insights from psychology also suggest that cities might be more likely,
and perhaps even better, first movers in this context. Many of those who
support human rights initiatives do so because they are purely oriented to
others, or because of the warm glow they receive in helping others. I argue
that, to the extent that support for human rights is motivated by altruism, it
is more likely to succeed at the local level than at the national level. This is
because I believe warm glow is likely to be enhanced in the local environment and dampened in the federal and international setting. In another context,110 I have described the importance of human rights treaties and their
related discourse in overcoming a particular fundamental attribution error
that bad things must happen to bad people who deserve them. I noted that
as a result of the fundamental attribution error and the belief in a just world,
when one sees something bad happen to individuals or groups, one often
engages in victim blame and derogation.111 This tendency is magnified
when victims are perceived of as meaningfully different from the relevant
community or if their suffering is likely to be difficult to remedy.112 Conversely, the tendency toward victim-blaming is weakened when the people
suffering are seen as similar to the witness,113 as empathy triggered by similarities can muffle or trump the instincts aroused by the belief in a just
world.114
I suggest in this paper that moving human rights to the local level can
emphasize the close relationship between those providing and those receiving assistance as well as allowing people to see the direct benefits of the
city’s provision of social services. This seems likely to be particularly important for positive rights and positive rights-enabling ordinances—it may
be the case that people are more likely to support such rights when they are
closer to the recipients. When altruism exists, evidence suggests that
people are most willing to self-sacrifice or redistribute with those with
whom they share physical or cultural proximity. They often privilege their

110. See Wexler, supra note 3, at 395-96.
111. Carolyn L. Hafer & Laurent Begue, Experimental Research on Just-World Theory:
Problems, Developments, and Future Challenges, 131 PSYCHOL. BULL. 128, 128 (2005).
112. Claudia Dalbert, Belief in a Just World, Well Being, and Coping with an Unjust
Fate, in RESPONSES TO VICTIMIZATIONS AND BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD 87, 100-01 (Leo Montada & Melvin J. Lerner eds., 1998); Melvin J. Lerner & Leo Montada, An Overview: Advances in Belief in a Just World Theory and Methods, in RESPONSES TO VICTIMIZATIONS AND
BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD, supra, at 2.
113. SHARON LAMB, THE TROUBLE WITH BLAME: VICTIMS, PERPETRATORS, AND RESPONSIBILITY 92 (1996); Lerner & Montada, supra note 112, at 4.
114. Leo Montada, Belief in a Just World: A Hybrid of Justice Motive and Self-Interest,
in RESPONSES TO VICTIMIZATIONS AND BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD, supra note 112, at 217, 243.
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relationships with those nearby at the expense of those farther away.115 Relatedly, “most citizens are much more likely to sacrifice for a compatriot
than a noncompatriot, especially when giving to noncompatriots comes at
the expense of needy compatriots.”116 This conclusion is consistent with
survey data which indicates “[a]n exceptional majority [of Americans
polled] favor[] fixing pressing problems at home rather than addressing
challenges to the United States from abroad” and a widespread American
preference for funding domestic programs over foreign aid.117
Not all cities will engage in such behavior and not all people will feel the
warm glow of giving, even if it is moved to the local level. As described
above, some, like the Positive Rights Rejecters, fundamentally believe the
provision of social services and positive rights is an inappropriate role for
the government or one it cannot engage in successfully. My point is a more
limited one: moving efforts down to the local level can dampen the belief
that positive rights ought not be provided because the recipients are unworthy, outsiders, or that their problems are unsolvable.
Second, for those less concerned with the warm glow of altruistically
passing human rights ordinances, local internationalism provides a definable set of benefits to citizens. While treaty signature and ratification is often touted as outward-looking and a mechanism to export our values
abroad, domestic human rights integration is all about benefitting the local
citizenry. Even if one does not anticipate needing the provision of social
services, enhancing transparency and anti-discrimination of local government officials is ostensibly something that benefits all local citizens, and

115. See Michael J. Green, Institutional Responsibility for Global Problems, 30 PHIL.
TOPICS 79, 79-85 (2002) (discussing the “restrictive conceptions” of responsibility).
116. Jack Goldsmith, Liberal Democracy and Cosmopolitan Duty, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1667, 1677 (2003). Of course, supporting government programs which redistribute is not
exactly the same as giving yourself, but for our purposes, they are close enough. Acting at
the city level allows altruistically-minded individuals to channel their efforts through local
government institutions which are much more likely to make a difference than individual
action alone. Government action solves the dilemma of collective action problems or the
belief that someone else will step in and help.
117. CHI. COUNCIL ON GLOBAL AFFAIRS, ANXIOUS AMERICANS SEEK NEW DIRECTION IN
UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY: RESULTS OF A 2008 SURVEY OF PUBLIC OPINION 6 (2008),
available at http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/UserFiles/File/POS_Topline%20Reports/
POS%202008/2008%20Public%20Opinion%202008_US%20Survey%20Results.pdf. Furthermore, “[t]he U.S. public does not view helping to bring a democratic form of government to other nations as a high priority. This foreign policy goal is considered ‘very important’ by only 17 percent of Americans, placing it at the bottom of the list of fifteen goals.”
Id. at 15.
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they are more likely to see and experience the benefit than a similar reformation at the state or federal level.118
4.

Utilizing Structural Advantages

Finally, many cities are structurally better suited to pass the human
rights proposals discussed below than the federal government is to ratify
human rights treaties. The proposals and ordinances I discuss below could
come from either mayors or city councils. While developing political consensus in favor of a new proposal is often difficult, particularly when such
a proposal commits the city to spending resources or reforming its own bureaucracy, no city councils of which I am aware contain the sort of filibuster mechanisms embedded in the Senate. Of course, those cities run by either strong mayors opposed to proposals or coalitions of elites that oppose
the substance of treaties will be unlikely to push such changes through.
That being said, many of the stable coalitions that can arise in a city may be
responsive to the public interest in favor of the treaties.119
It should be unsurprising that many cities possess a structure that allows
the passage of ordinances more easily than the federal government can ratify treaties or pass human rights legislation. In many instances, the U.S.
Senate is sui generis because the framers crafted it as an anti-democratic
check on the House of Representatives.120 No such concerns dominated the
creation of city governance structures. Also, given the limited reach of city
governments on the front end and states’ broad ability to preempt city behavior on the back end, states might have been less concerned about embedding chokepoints for city action in the city structure itself. Moreover,
constituent preferences tend to play a larger role in the behavior of local
governments than in state or federal governments because individual citizens believe that their voices matter more in the local setting121 and they
have greater capacity to prevent capture by special interest groups.122 Thus
118. Goldsmith, supra note 116, at 1677 (explaining why people are more altruistic to
those that are closer).
119. Schragger, supra note 92, at 2551.
120. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The One Senator, One Vote Clause, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
159 (1995). Most state senates look much more like their sister house of representatives
than the federal senate.
121. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM.
L. REV. 346, 397 (1990).
122. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV.
277, 297 (2007) (noting that constituents of small local governments can ensure responsiveness by monitoring local officials and exercising exit); Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case
for Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1070-71 (2007) (identifying the opportunities for participation in the decision-making processes of small local
government).
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the political homogeneity described above gains additional weight in city
as opposed to state or federal politics.
In sum, given the combined effects of political homogeneity, the avoidance of federalist and foreign policy objections, the enhanced warm glow
and other individual benefits, and the structure of many city governments,
we should expect to see a few major blue cities like San Francisco, New
York, and Chicago along with smaller cities like Eugene, Berkeley, and
Chapel Hill adopting such policies. Other like-minded (and likely nearby)123 cities that do not wish to be innovators may wait to see the outcome
of the ordinances and then model themselves on the ones that succeed.
That being said, I do not anticipate a quick, ensuing cascade to either more
diverse or more politically moderate cities and suburbs. Just as some cities’ political preferences will favor the substance of human rights ordinances, others will not. Successful innovation can convince sympathetic
neighbors and over time may even influence the perception of human
rights; but as described in the subsection below, city ordinances are not
going to quickly turn red cities, states, and federal governments blue.124
C.
1.
a.

Limitations
Structural

Federal Constitution

As I and others have dealt with these arguments elsewhere,125 I wish to
only briefly revisit the constitutional limits on city action in integrating international human rights law. First, the Constitution provides several textual limitations including the federal government’s exclusive authority to
conduct treaties with foreign powers,126 which clearly precludes cities from
joining a multilateral treaty regime or participating in its governance.
These limits probably matter more for environmental agreements, which
involve collective action problems, while many human rights agreements

123. See Brian Galle & Joseph Leahy, Laboratories of Democracy? Policy Innovation in
Decentralized Governments, 58 EMORY L.J. 1333, 1350-51 (2009) (explaining why a jurisdiction can more easily adopt a policy of its neighbor than of a distant jurisdiction).
124. Human rights need not correlate with red/blue party politics, but in practice they often do. Cities are all over the map with their approaches to immigration, ranging from hostile anti-employment and anti-housing policies to sanctuary cities devoted to noncooperation laws that “make their boundaries safe-havens for undocumented immigrants.”
Matthew J. Parlow, Progressive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional
Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 376-78 (2008).
125. See, e.g., Wexler, supra note 2, at 41-47.
126. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
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govern seemingly purely internal matters. Even human rights treaties,
however, include governance structures in which cities cannot participate.
The Compact Clause also limits sub-federal actors’ ability to conduct
agreements and compacts: courts have interpreted this clause as requiring
congressional approval for arrangements that increase a state’s political
power or encroach on the nation’s power.127 Thus, taking the clause to its
logical conclusion, sub-federal actors like cities cannot bypass the U.S.
Government if they seek to conclude binding commitments with other government actors. For agreements with foreign countries or foreign cities,
American cities must find some other way to signal their intent to be
bound, such as the use of memoranda of understanding and other nonbinding pacts to signal their intentions.
In addition to the textual constitutional limits on sub-federal action, the
federal government retains the power to preempt sub-federal initiatives.128
Thus, Congress may pass a statute to preempt a particular act of sub-federal
integration or it may rely on courts to enforce its preferences.129 In recent
years, the Supreme Court has used statutory preemption in cases like Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council to strike down a Massachusetts law
banning state procurement from companies doing business in Burma, because the state ban interfered with the more calibrated federal sanctions
policy.130
The Supreme Court has also found preemption on the basis of dormant
federal powers. In the 1968 case Zschernig v. Miller, the Supreme Court
suggested that any state laws with “more than some incidental or indirect
effect” on foreign affairs would be invalid, regardless of any showing of
direct conflict with federal actions or even any affirmative federal activity
in the subject area.131 The more recent case of American Insurance Asso127. See, e.g., Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438–42 (1981); see also Andrew A.
Bruce, The Compacts and Agreements of States with One Another and with Foreign Powers,
2 MINN. L. REV. 500 (1918).
128. Courts have recognized the following varieties of preemption: (1) express preemption, in which a federal statute clearly expresses Congress’s desire to exclude state activity;
(2) obstacle preemption, in which a state statute stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment
of the purposes and objectives of a federal statute; (3) conflict preemption, in which a state
statute makes it impossible to comply with federal law; and (4) field preemption, in which
the federal government has acted so definitely in a field that there is “no room for the States
to supplement it,” or the federal interest in controlling the subject is strong enough to presume federal law precludes state action. Jack Goldsmith, Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 205-06 (2000) (developing this useful taxonomy of preemption cases).
129. See generally Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the
Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE L.J. 1127 (2000).
130. 530 U.S. 363, 366, 378-79 (2000).
131. 389 U.S. 429, 434-35 (1968) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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ciation v. Garamendi132 may have revived Zschernig’s long ignored foreign
affairs preemption doctrine by raising the possibility of independent executive branch preemption authority.133 Sub-federal integration deepens this
uncertainty by raising the question of when treaty rejection or treaty avoidance constitutes a policy sufficient to preempt sub-federal action.
Ultimately, whatever constitutional limits exist, they constrain subfederal action only to the extent that sub-federal actors either face or at
least fear facing federal enforcement.134 In many prior instances of subfederal activism, the federal government has been reluctant to intervene.
Despite the broad language in Holmes v. Jennison,135 states have concluded
numerous covenants with foreign entities, including environmental pacts,
without seeking congressional approval.136 Neither Congress nor the courts
have spoken on these covenants,137 nor have they acted to preempt a variety of questionable city behaviors such as those declaring non-binding nuclear weapons-free zones;138 divesting stock from firms doing business in
South Africa; restricting procurement of goods and services when the bidder for a city contract did business in South Africa;139 and passing an or-

132. 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
133. The Court held that executive branch agreements with foreign countries to settle insurance claims arising out of World War II preempted a California law forcing disclosure of
information on insurance companies operating during World War II. While the executive
branch agreements did not expressly preempt state laws or even address all the countries
covered by the California law, the state policy of forcing broad disclosure was found to undermine the executive policy of encouraging voluntary establishment of settlement funds
and limiting disclosure of insurance policy information. Garamendi renders the future reach
of preemption doctrine uncertain. Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American
Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 825, 949-50 (2004) (acknowledging that Garamendi could increase executive power, but contending that Garamendi merely reflected the court’s dissatisfaction with
the “peculiar and overreaching scope of the [disclosure] statute”).
134. Some government officials might also feel limited by their oath to uphold the Constitution, but I suspect few in substantive support for such policies would conceptualize their
activities as violating the Constitution.
135. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
136. Peter R. Jennetten, State Environmental Agreements with Foreign Powers: The
Compact Clause and the Foreign Affairs Power of the States, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV.
141, 168-72 (1995); Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign
Policies, 86 FOREIGN POL’Y 158, 163 (1992).
137. Shuman, supra note 136, at 163.
138. See id. at 158 (detailing the “explosive growth of municipal foreign policy” in this
area).
139. David D. Caron, The Structure and Pathologies of Local Selective Procurement Ordinances: A Study of Apartheid-Era South Africa Ordinances, 21 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 159,
160-61 (2003). A suit was filed against the Baltimore ordinance but the Justice Department
declined to join the suit. Bd. of Trs. Employees Ret. Sys. of Balt. v. Mayor of Balt., 562
A.2d 720 (Md. 1989).
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dinance repudiating torture committed by the Bush administration. On the
other hand, Congress did expressly preempt state anti-boycott laws, which
prohibited state residents from conducting certain transactions with Arab
states.140 Similarly, the Justice Department filed suit and defeated an Oakland ordinance that banned firms from doing weapons manufacturing work
and restricted the transportation of nuclear materials through the city’s jurisdiction.141 Both Crosby and Garamendi suggest that federal courts may
be embracing a more expansive preemption policy, which may in turn encourage more challenges.
b.

State Limits

In addition to federal preemption, states can also place significant limits
on their behavior.142 To begin with, for much of their history, cities acted
under the severe restraints of the Dillon Rule which only allowed localities
to exercise those powers expressly granted by the state.143 For the last century, the creation of home rule has allowed local governments to exercise
all powers the state has not expressly reserved to itself.144 Almost all states
have granted most of their cities home rule powers which permit them to
set up local constitutions and to legislate in areas of local concern. Even
with home rule, however, states tended to significantly limit local policy
making145 and many state courts viewed the scope of purely local concern
to be quite narrow.146 This frustration led to a second round of reform, in
which many states granted cities legislative home rule.147 This expanded
authority changed the courts’ preemption analysis to a determination of
whether the city ordinance conflicts with state law.148
Of course states can, like the federal government, also preempt city behavior through new, direct legislation or judicial interpretation of existing
powers and legislation. States have shown limited, but real interest in
140. Howard N. Fenton III, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 563, 567 (1993).
141. United States v. Oakland, No. C-89-3305 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
142. See David J. Barron & Gerald E. Frug, Defensive Localism: A View from the Field,
21 J.L. & POL. 261 (2005).
143. Kenneth A. Stahl, The Suburb as a Legal Concept: The Problem of Organization
and the Fate of Municipalities in American Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1193, 1206-07
(2008).
144. Michael Monroe Kellogg Sebree, Comment, One Century of Constitutional Home
Rule: A Progress Report?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 155, 156 (1989).
145. Barron & Frug, supra note 142, at 261.
146. See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW 282-83 (6th ed. 2004).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 260-70.
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preempting some city ordinances consistent with human rights. For instance, some state courts have found city living wage ordinances to be impermissible intrusions on state power.149 Moreover, after state courts
upheld local ordinances under the city’s authority, one state passed legislation explicitly preempting living wage laws.150 This sort of preemption
seems most likely to occur when a very blue city acts in a very red state
that does not share its ideology, and the policy has negative spillover effects on other cities in the state.
Business and other interest groups may, and in fact are likely to, seek to
use state courts and legislatures to preempt city ordinances.151 For instance, Paul Diller credits successful city ordinances as prompting states to
preempt the following ordinances: restaurant smoking bans, domestic partnership benefits for government employees, and rent control ordinances.152
Sometimes the mere fear of city innovation will prompt proactive preemption in advance of city policies such as Louisiana’s state law forbidding cities to increase the minimum wage above state levels.153
Businesses have two reasons to protest: they may fear that they will suffer specific high local costs in conforming to the regulation, and they may
desire uniformity in regulation because the costs of complying with a patchwork of varying city regulations is higher than complying with a single
policy.154 For instance, businesses have opposed smoking bans, gay rights
legislation, and living wage laws under this rationale.155 One reason they

149. New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 2d
1098, 1101-02, 1108 (La. 2002).
150. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 104.001(2) (West 2010).
151. Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1113 (2007).
152. Id. at 1118-19. At least four states—Arizona, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Oregon—have legislation that expressly preempts local rent control ordinances. See ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 33-1329 (2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-12-301 (West 2010); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 40P, § 5 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91.225 (West 2010).
State legislatures in other states—namely, New York and California—have passed legislation aimed at weakening local rent control laws. See California Begins Easing Its OnceStrict Laws on Rent Control, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 1995, at A21.
153. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:642 (2009); Diller, supra note 151, at 1139 & n.117.
154. Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 22-23 (2007); Louis Uchitelle, Minimum
Wages, City by City; As More Local Laws Pass, More Businesses Complain, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 19, 1999, at C1.
155. Modern Cigarette, Inc. v. Town of Orange, 774 A.2d 969, 976 (Conn. 2001); Lexington Fayette County Food & Beverage Ass’n v. Lexington Fayette Urban County Gov’t,
131 S.W.3d 745, 748 (Ky. 2004); Allied Vending Inc. v. City of Bowie, 631 A.2d 77, 78
(Md. 1993); Tri-Nel Mgmt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health, 741 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass. 2001); Take
Five Vending, Ltd. v. Town of Provincetown, 615 N.E.2d 576, 578 (Mass. 1993); C.I.C.
Corp. v. Twp. of E. Brunswick, 628 A.2d 753, 754 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993); Vatore
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might succeed at the state level is because businesses hurt by the regulation
will
often protest vociferously and, in some instances, receive the support of
groups that purport to represent the entire business community, such as
chambers of commerce. At the same time, perhaps out of a sense of “probusiness” solidarity, or because the gains from the proposed local regulation are too small and diffuse to those business [sic] that stand to benefit,
support from the business community for many new local regulations is
often muted or nonexistent.156

When the political preferences of the city override business interests,
businesses can get the state government to explicitly override these ordinances.157 The same reasons that favor the ordinance’s proponents seeking
city rather than state reform, favor the businesses at the state level. Lobbying state legislatures is more expensive, which often benefits business interests,158 though it does mean that they may not seek to undertake action
where the costs of the ordinance are low.
Finally, in the absence of express preemption by the legislature, opponents of the ordinance may seek judicial preemption. State court jurisprudence is similar to what is described above in federal preemption jurisprudence. If there is no express preemption, federal and state courts will look
for implied preemption which will either occur through conflict with state
laws or state occupation of the field. In undertaking conflict preemption,
state courts often ask “whether a local ordinance substantially interferes
with state law or the state’s constitutional responsibilities.”159 While
preemption poses a real limitation—scholars present the courts’ jurisprudence in this area as a “problematic shadow”160—some room for local innovation still exists.
2.

Limited Spillover: State, Federal, and International

On occasion, city innovation has spurred state spillovers. Though human rights ordinances face a significant uphill battle, such experiments
may hasten state or federal action in at least two instances. If the federal
government and the states resist human rights efforts because they are un-

v. Comm’r of Consumer Affairs, 634 N.E.2d 958, 958-59 (N.Y. 1994); Amico’s, Inc. v.
Mattos, 789 A.2d 899, 901 (R.I. 2002).
156. Diller, supra note 151, at 1134.
157. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 146, at 282-83 (noting this is particularly
when the city has legislative home rule).
158. Diller, supra note 151, at 1139-42.
159. Id. at 1142 & n.131.
160. David J. Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2366 (2003).
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sure of the benefits of such programs, then spillover would be a strong possibility after successful city action.161 In such a world, cities bear the costs
and risks of innovating and the states and federal government could simply
free ride off of their efforts. Second, and perhaps more importantly, if city
efforts change constituents’ underlying objections to the promotion of positive rights, then spillover is also a possibility. In the final work of this
cycle, I intend to discuss the ways in which local efforts can serve as a mechanism to articulate and justify human rights principles. Perhaps such justifications might be persuasive to those outside the jurisdiction in which the
human rights are enacted. If so, then spillover is possible, though I anticipate this process to be a very long one with limited effects given the power
of other constraints. Though part of the point of this series of articles is to
point out that the United States is in need of international law’s influence
and that domestic law does not perfectly mirror the content of international
human rights treaties, existing city-level efforts are, in general, unlikely to
trigger widespread state, federal, or global change.
Those other constraints can be distilled from many of the observations
described above. Though citizens may experience warm glow or more direct personal benefits from human rights ordinances, such policies often
raise significant costs as well. While one reason posited for the emergence
of city and state environmental mini-Kyoto policies is the possibility of
economic gain, human rights treaties are unlikely to present similar short
term economic gains. Providing positive rights is likely to prove quite expensive. Perhaps, highly motivated, politically homogenous groups are
willing to bear those costs, but the discussion of preemption suggests most
other participants in state-level politics are not. Resistance may come from
those most likely to pay for such proposals or from those unconvinced of
human rights’ theoretical soundness. So just as most large cities are blue
with some willingness to support such efforts, many smaller cities are red
and passing ordinances in the opposite direction for much the same reasons—they are politically homogenous, feel their ideological preferences
are underrepresented on the federal and state level, and receive a warm
glow from public oriented legislation such as anti-immigration policies and
restrictions on sex offenders.
Further constraints hamper the domestic and the international level.
While many are optimistic that building up domestic human rights will also
translate into greater ability to promote human rights treaties, that relationship does not necessarily follow. To return to the arguments made at the
beginning of the paper, city ordinances simply do not have to grapple with

161. Galle & Leahy, supra note 123.
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some of the most important objections to human rights treaties. Many
Americans believe that they ought not “interpret and enforce human rights
for people living in other countries”162 even as they support human rights at
home. Similarly, city experiments provide us no data about the legitimacy
of the International Federalists and Flexible Foreign Policy Advocates arguments. If local experiments fail to address these objections, then opponents will continue to use senatorial chokepoints to block treaty ratification.
In turn, that limits, though does not extinguish, the possibilities for international human rights relationships to develop and grow.
CONCLUSION
As this Article posits, the world in which the federal government will
not ratify human rights treaties, local human rights internationalism may
provide a second best option. Politically homogenous cities may be able to
pass ordinances that express support for human rights treaties, enable the
exercise of human rights, reform state behavior that violates human rights,
and create the first step toward the utilization of positive rights. These ordinances can matter a great deal to the individuals that benefit from them
and the communities that embrace them. Yet isolated ordinances alone
seem unlikely to create the sort of justification for expansive human rights
that will spillover to widespread state endorsement and federal ratification.
Thus, the next article in this project will address the question of how to use
the administrative state to create a better foundation for widespread domestic human rights support.

162. THE OPPORTUNITY AGENDA, supra note 103, at 28.

